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ONLY A NAME? TRADEMARK ROYALTIES, NEXUS, AND
TAXING THAT WHICH ENRICHES
Sheldon H. Laskin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands:
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.'
What Shakespeare's classic villain Jago first said of the value of an
individual's good name in the seventeenth century remains equally true
for the value of a business name in the twenty-first. Reflecting the fact
that the value of a good name is often the greatest asset a business can
have, tradenames and trademarks are very big business indeed. In
2004, Coca-Cola's trademark was valued at more than $67 billion,
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1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE act 3, sc. 3.
2. A tradename is a "name, style, or symbol used to distinguish a company, partnership or
business (as opposed to a product or service); [it is] the name under which a business operates."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1533 (8th ed. 2004). A trademark is a "word, phrase, logo, or other
graphic symbol used by a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from those of
others." Id. at 1530.
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Microsoft's brand was worth $61 billion, IBM's mark came in at $54
billion, GE's at $44 billion, and Intel's at $34 billion.3
The value of intellectual property-copyrights and patents as well
as trademarks and tradenames-reflects the increased importance of
intangible assets to the current highly mobile service economy and the
corresponding decreased importance of land and other fixed assets that
made up the backbone of the old manufacturing economy.4
It is not at all surprising that the use of an asset as valuable as a
trademark raises significant state taxation issues. For tax purposes,
where is a trademark to be located? Does it matter for state tax purposes
whether the record title holder of the trademark is an affiliate of the
entity that uses the trademark in conducting a retail business? If a state
has a sufficient connection with the trademark holder to tax its income,
what is the most appropriate method to apportion royalty income
received by the trademark holder? And what is the most appropriate
constitutional nexus standard to apply to businesses that realize income
entirely through the sale of digital goods or services via electronic
commerce? This Article explores these and related questions.
A basic tenet of tax law in the American system is that no one has
an obligation to maximize his taxes. The classic formulation of this
principle is the famous dictum of Judge Learned Hand that, "Any one
may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is
not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there
is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.",
5
Given the amount of money involved, it is understandable that
holders of intellectual property will seek to minimize their state tax
responsibilities through various tax planning techniques. But those tax
planning techniques can only succeed if done in accordance with all
applicable legal principles, including federal constitutional principles
that govern when a state has a sufficient nexus, or connection, with a
taxpayer to tax its income. This Article contends that the formation of a
passive investment company ("PIC")--a common tax planning
3. Diane Brady et al., Cult Brands; The Business Week/lnterbrand Annual Ranking of the
World's Most Valuable Brands Shows the Power of Passionate Consumers, BUS. WK., Aug. 2,
2004, at 64, 68 (ranking 100 most valuable worldwide trademarks). Rounding out Business Week's
list of the 10 most valuable brands in 2004 were Disney at more than $27 billion, McDonald's ($25
billion), Nokia ($24 billion), Toyota ($23 billion) and Marlboro ($22 billion). Id.
4. See DAVID BRUNORI, STATE TAX POLICY: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 34 (2d ed. 2005)
("The service industry relies far more on human capital and intangible property... than does the
traditional manufacturing industry. ... Plants, equipment and land-the inputs that are most
difficult to move-are relatively minor components of today's booming electronic commerce.").
5. Comm'r v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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technique to shield royalty income derived from the use of intellectual
property from state taxation-should be an ineffective tax planning
technique because it does not sever the nexus between the PIC and the
taxing state.
This Article asserts that the correct constitutional nexus standard
for state taxation of royalty income derived from the use of trademarks
and tradenames is the well-established business situs rule for taxing
intangibles. Pursuant to the business situs rule, a state may, consistent
with federal constitutional requirements, levy an appropriately
apportioned tax on the trademark royalty income of a business that has
purposefully availed itself of the benefits and opportunities of doing
business in that state. That is, intellectual property is presumed to have a
taxing situs at any location where it is used to realize income. A state
may therefore assert income tax nexus with a business located in another
state if the business derives trademark royalty income in the taxing state;
the creation of a PIC in a state that does not tax the royalty income
(hereinafter, "tax haven state") is ineffective in shielding the trademark-
holding company from income tax nexus in its affiliate's market states.
Part II briefly discusses the general differences between combined
and separate entity income tax reporting, the primary methods by which
a multi-state business reports its income to the states in which it
operates.
Part III describes how separate entity reporting encourages the
formation of PICs so as to avoid income tax on operating income earned
in the separate entity states. Part III also explores state responses to this
tax avoidance technique. Part III then analyzes the physical presence
use tax collection nexus rule and examines the state case law that has
addressed the issue of whether the physical presence nexus rule should
also apply to the corporate income tax.
Part IV presents an historical overview of the business situs rule for
taxing income derived from intangibles. Part IV also explains why the
Supreme Court's use tax collection nexus jurisprudence does not
preclude application of the business situs rule in taxing trademark
royalty income.
Part V discusses several ramifications of the business situs rule as
applied to PICs, including implications for the taxation of an author's
royalty income and the appropriate apportionment formula for taxing
trademark royalty income.
Part VI is a critique of recent proposed federal legislation that
would create a physical presence income tax nexus standard.
Part VII provides a broad analytical framework for approaching
3
Laskin: Only a Name? Trademark Royalties, Nexus, and Taxing That Which En
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
income tax nexus as applied to electronic commerce.
This Article concludes that a physical presence nexus rule for
taxing the income derived from intangibles is inconsistent with well-
established and soundly reasoned Supreme Court jurisprudence and
would be totally incongruous in our modem, service-based economy.
Instead, the business situs rule for taxing intangibles remains the
appropriate nexus rule for taxing the income of a PIC. Finally, this
Article proposes that nexus should be determined through the use of
uniform, easily verifiable economic thresholds that would apply
irrespective of the form in which the business provides its services or
products.
II. THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: COMBINED AND SEPARATE ENTITY
REPORTING
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia currently impose an
income-based tax on corporations.6  Of those states, approximately half
require or allow each affiliate of a related corporate group that does
business within the state to file separate tax returns for that affiliate; not
surprisingly, these states are called "separate entity" states.7 The
remaining states require all members of a corporate unitary business to
file a "combined report."
8
Separate entity states calculate the taxable income and
apportionment percentage of each corporate affiliate doing business
6. 1 JOHN C. HEALY & MICHAEL S. SCHADEWALD, 2007 MULTISTATE CORPORATE TAX
GUIDE 1-3 (2007).
7. See id. at 1-495 to -498. Of the forty-five states, plus the District of Columbia, that are
listed as imposing a corporate income tax, twenty states are listed as either mandating a combined
return in all circumstances or allowing the state to require a combined return if certain conditions
are met. Id. This leaves twenty-six states where combined reporting is either not allowed or is
available entirely at the election of the taxpayer. The term "separate entity states" as used in this
article, refers to those twenty-six states. John Mackay Metzger, Unitary Taxation in New Jersey, 28
SETON HALL L. REV. 162, 167 (1997) (describing a "separate entity state" as a state "where each
subject corporate legal entity is required to file its own corporation tax return").
8. 1 HEALY & SCHADEWALD, supra note 6, at 1-495 to -498. A combined report is not a
consolidated return, in that each affiliate of a unitary business must ordinarily file a separate return.
2 RICHARD D. POMP & OLIVER OLDMAN, STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 10-38 (5th ed. 2005). A
combined report simply requires all affiliates of a unitary business to include the factors and income
of those affiliates on the report. Id. A corporate enterprise is said to be "unitary" if there are
significant flows of value between the affiliates as measured by the following factors: functional
integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale. See Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 166 (1983) (discussing the unitary business concept and citing
cases that furthered the concept). In most combined reporting states, membership in a combined
unitary group generally requires more than a 50% ownership interest. I HEALY & SCHADEWALD,
supra note 6, at 1-444.
4
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within the state as if those affiliates were unrelated strangers. 9 As a
result, the income (or loss) of one affiliate has no effect on the
calculation of income or loss for any other affiliate, and the
apportionment factors of each affiliate are calculated separately.
Conversely, combined reporting states calculate business income
for unitary affiliates as if they were divisions of the same entity.
10
Inter-corporate transactions between them would be eliminated and the
income reported... [by] the subsidiary would be added to the income
reported... [by] the parent .... Similarly, the apportionment
percentage would be calculated bK taking into account the factors of
both the parent and the subsidiary.
III. THE PASSIVE INVESTMENT COMPANY ("PIC")
A. The PIC and Separate Entity Reporting
As a general rule, a combined report does not systematically lead to
a higher or lower tax than would separate reporting. 12  However,
separate entity reporting does present opportunities for tax avoidance
that are not available in a combined reporting state. One particularly
widespread tax avoidance technique is the creation in a tax haven state
of a holding company that owns the intellectual property of affiliates
doing business in the separate entity states.' 3 These holding companies
have been historically referred to as Delaware holding companies.1
4
Currently, they are commonly referred to as passive investment
companies (PICs).
Perhaps the first thing to say about a Delaware holding company is
that it need not be based in Delaware; the technique works equally well
9. 2 POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 8, at 10-37. For a discussion of the apportionment of
corporate income for tax purposes, see infra Part V.B.
10. 2 POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 8, at 10-37.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Although this article focuses on the use of a passive investment company to shelter
trademark royalty income, separate entity reporting provides opportunities for additional forms of
tax avoidance through the formation of holding companies in tax shelter states. For example, the
formation of a holding company in Delaware to own stock and bonds of its parent corporation that
would otherwise result in apportionable business income results in tax-free dividends and interest to
the holding company. 2 POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 8, at 10-41.
14. An early use of the term "Delaware holding company" appears in Wesley Yang,
Utilization of Delaware Holding Companies to Save State Income Taxes, 34 TAX EXECUTIVE 169
(1982).
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if the holding company is located in any state that does not tax passive
investment income, or has no income tax at all.15
Another strategy is to create a holding company in a state where the
taxpayer is already filing a combined return.' 6  Doing so does not
increase the combined state tax liability for the unitary business, as intra-
corporate transactions within the unitary business are ignored in a
combined report.17
A leading authority in state taxation has described how a PIC 18 is
used to shelter royalty income derived from the use of trademarks and
tradenames from taxation in the separate entity states.
One typical use of a [PIC] is for a corporation to transfer valuable
trademarks and trade names to a holding company. The holding
company executes a license agreement allowing its parent to use the
transferred property. In return, the parent pays its subsidiaries a
royalty, which it deducts in calculating the taxable income it
apportions to the states where it does business. ....
The licensing of a trademark is only one way of using a [PIC] in an
attempt to generate a deduction to the payor without any tax to the
payee. Another way would involve loans made by the [PIC] to related
corporations.[ 19] The objective would be for the payor to deduct the
payment of interest in calculating its apportionable taxable income and
for the payee to be exempt from taxation by [the tax shelter state] (and
by any other state) on the receipt of the interest.20
The amount of income sheltered from taxation as a result of the
creation of a PIC is huge. In one case, nine wholly-owned subsidiary
15. A Delaware-based corporation whose activities in Delaware are limited to maintaining
and managing intangible assets that generate income, such as capital gains, dividends, interest and
royalties, is exempt from Delaware income tax. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(b)(8) (2006).
Similarly, royalty income is not subject to Michigan's Single Business Tax. MICH. COMP. LAWS §
208.9(7)(c) (2006). Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming do not impose a corporate income tax. 1
HEALY & SCRADEWALD, supra note 6, at 1-497 to -498. Washington also does not impose a
corporate income tax. Id. at 1-462. But the Washington business and occupation tax would include
gross receipts from royalties received by a Washington-based holding company in the tax base. Id.
at 1-206 to -207.
16. 2 POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 8, at 10-41.
17. Id. at 10-37.
18. Because the term Delaware holding company falsely implies that the company must be
located in Delaware, this article instead uses the terms "passive investment company" or "PIC."
19. The two techniques are often combined. A PIC receiving trademark royalties from its
affiliates often loans the royalty income back to those affiliates, who then deduct the interest on the
loans from their taxable income in the states in which they operate. See, e.g., A&F Trademark, Inc.
v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
20. 2 POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 8, at 10-41.
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PICs of the Limited, Inc. received royalty payments and interest from
their affiliates in the amount of $423,098,963 in one year.2'
Furthermore, these PICs often demonstrate little, if any, economic
substance. The nine Limited PICs had no employees, and shared office
space, equipment, and supplies.22 The primary office space used by the
nine PICs was also the primary office address for more than 650 other
companies, none of which was related to either the Limited or any of its
wholly-owned subsidiaries.23
B. State Responses to the PIC
States have sought to address the use of PICs to avoid income
taxation in a variety of ways. A number of states have sought to deny
the deductions taken by the affiliates on a case-by-case basis, asserting
that the formation of the PIC lacked business purpose or economic
substance.24 A number of states have enacted statutes that require a
company to add back deductions taken for payments made to an
affiliated PIC.25 In addition, the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) has
proposed a Model Statute Requiring the Addback of Certain Intangible
26
and Interest Expenses.
21. A&F Trademark, 605 S.E.2d at 189.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 189-90.
24. These cases often turn on subtle factual distinctions, and the states that have gone this
route have met with mixed results. Compare Syms Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 765 N.E.2d 758
(Mass. 2002) (denying deductions and finding no valid business purpose for or economic substance
to PIC) with Sherwin-Williams Co v. Comm'r of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 2002) (allowing
deductions and finding that the formation of PIC had economic substance and that it was irrelevant
that motive for forming PIC was tax planning). But see Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 784 N.Y.S.2d 178 (App. Div. 2004), appeal denied, 4 N.Y.3d 709 (2005) (requiring
taxpayer, on same facts as Massachusetts' Sherwin-Williams Co., v. Commissioner of Revenue, to
file combined return in New York because formation of PIC lacked business purpose or economic
substance).
25. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-18-35(b)(1) (2005); IND. CODE § 6-3-2-20 (2006); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 141.205 (West 2006). As of 2006, eighteen states, and the District of Columbia, have
adopted statutes or regulations that disallow related party expenditures between a PIC and its
operating affiliates under a variety of circumstances. Tammy Hunter, Presentation at the
Georgetown University 29th Annual Advanced State and Local Tax Institute: Current
Developments in Multistate Taxation, at 15 (May 18, 2006) (on file with author). These provisions
generally provide an exemption from disallowance in several contexts, including when the
formation of the PIC had a business purpose or there is economic substance to the PIC. Philip M.
Plant, The Addback Statute Wars - The Taxpayers' Case, 37 ST. TAX NOTES 585 (2005).
26. MODEL STATUTE REQUIRING THE ADD-BACK OF CERTAIN INTANGIBLE AND INTEREST
EXPENSES (Multistate Tax Comm'n, Proposed Official Draft 2006), available at
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate TaxCommission/Uniformity/UniformityProjects/A
_- Z/Add-Back%20-%20FINAL%20version.pdf. The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) was
7
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Other states have addressed the issue by allowing the in-state
affiliate to take deductions for the payments made to the PIC, while
asserting jurisdiction to tax the out-of-state PIC on the income received
from the affiliates.27 Invariably, the PIC in these cases has asserted that
there is an insufficient connection, or "nexus," between the state and the
PIC for the state to assert its taxing authority under the Due Process
Clause 28 and the Commerce Clause 29 of the United States Constitution.
In support of their argument, the PICs rely on nexus principles
developed, not in the context of the corporate income tax, but in the very
different context of use tax collection. It is therefore necessary to
discuss briefly the Supreme Court's use tax collection nexus
jurisprudence.
C. The Physical Presence Use Tax Nexus Rule
In 1967, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether a
state can constitutionally require an out-of-state seller whose only
connections with its customers in the taxing state are by common carrier
or U.S. mail to collect use tax on its sales to those customers.30
created in 1967 as the administrative agency of the Multistate Tax Compact. U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 454-57 (1978). Among its functions, the Commission is
charged by Article VI, Section 3 of the Compact to study state and local tax systems and to develop
and recommend proposals for an increase in uniformity and compatibility of state and local tax laws
in order to encourage simplicity and improvement in state and local tax law and administration. Id.
at 456. Pursuant to Article VI, Section 3, the Commission adopted the Model Addback Statute at its
annual meeting in Topeka, KS on August 17, 2006. See MODEL STATUTE REQUIRING THE ADD-
BACK OF CERTAIN INTANGIBLE AND INTEREST EXPENSES.
27. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993) (finding that physical
presence is not required for state to tax royalty income received by out-of-state trademark holding
company from in-state affiliate); Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2006-NMCA-26,
139 N.M. 177, 131 P.3d 27 (2001) (same); Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 825 A.2d 399
(Md. 2003) (same); A&F Trademark, 605 S.E.2d 187 (same); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n,
2006 OK CIV APP 27, 132 P.3d 632 (same); Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 908 A.2d 176,
177 (N.J. 2006) ("[W]e do not believe that the Supreme Court intended to create a universal
physical-presence requirement for state taxation under the Commerce Clause.").
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
30. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of II1., 386 U.S. 753 (1967). Prior to Bellas
Hess, the Court had sustained a state's constitutional authority to require a remote seller to collect
use tax in a variety of contexts. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939) (in-state
agents); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941) (catalog sales when seller also
maintains stores in state); Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941 ) (same);
General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) (employees soliciting
orders in state, which are accepted and filled from out of state); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S.
207 (1960) (independent contractors soliciting orders in state, which are accepted and filled from
out of state).
8
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 22 [2007], Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol22/iss1/1
2007] TRADEMARK ROYALTIES, NEXUS, AND TAXING THAT WHICH ENRICHES 9
In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, the Court
ruled that a state was barred by both the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause from requiring an out-of-state mail order company to
collect use tax on its sales to customers in the taxing state, if the
company's connections to those customers were limited to the
solicitation of orders by advertisements mailed to the customers, with
any resulting orders filled by U.S. mail or common carrier.3
The Court in Bellas Hess created a safe harbor from use tax
collection for sellers whose only connection with the taxing state is by
U.S. mail or common carrier-a safe harbor which mirrored the existing
practices of the states that then imposed a use tax.
In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens on
National in this case, we would have to repudiate totally the sharp
distinction... between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors,
or property within a State, and those who do no more than
communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as
part of a general interstate business. But this basic distinction, which
until now has been generally recognized by the state taxing authorities,
is a valid one, and we decline to obliterate it.
32
The Court noted that, as of 1965, eleven states besides Illinois
required mail order sellers to collect use tax. 33 However, none of the tax
administrators in those states considered in-state advertising alone to be
sufficient to create nexus.34 Read in this light, the Bellas Hess decision
can be viewed as a judicial rebuke to the one outlier state that had
exceeded the limit of state use tax jurisdiction universally applied by
every other relevant state.
In contrast, at least thirty states take the position that licensing a
trademark or tradename creates corporate income or franchise tax
nexus.35 To the extent that the Bellas Hess nexus rule merely mirrored
state practice, the Court's rationale supports a contrary income tax nexus
rule as applied to income received by a PIC from its affiliates.
The Court further explained its holding in Bellas Hess by stating:
[I]f the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon National were
upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free conduct of its
interstate business would be neither imaginary nor remote. For if
31. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758. The Court did not analyze the case separately under the
Due Process and the Commerce Clauses.
32. Id. (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
33. Id.atn.11.
34. Id.
35. 1 HEALY & SCHADEWALD, supra note 6, at 1-72 to -74.
9
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Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other State, and so,
indeed, can every municipality, every school district, and every other
political subdivision throughout the Nation with power to impose sales
and use taxes.
36
It is important to note that the Court specifically spoke of use tax
burdens, not the general burden of paying taxes and filing returns.
Under the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, "with certain
restrictions, interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of
state taxes. 37  The Court has long made clear that "[i]t was not the
purpose of the Commerce Clause to relieve those engaged in interstate
commerce from their just share of [the] state tax burden even though it
increases the cost of doing the business. 38
The Court was very clear in Bellas Hess precisely which use tax
burdens informed its holding: "The many variations in rates of tax, in
allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping
requirements could entangle National's interstate business in a virtual
welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no
legitimate claim to impose 'a fair share of the cost of the local
government.'
39
Finally, the Court noted that the prevailing system of use tax
collection required a remote seller to administer rules that varied from
one state to another and which required the remote seller in each taxing
jurisdiction to interpret facts that were often too remote and uncertain for
the level of accuracy mandated by the system. 40  These concerns are
generally inapplicable to a corporate income or franchise tax.4 m
In 1992, the Supreme Court revisited its holding in Bellas Hess. In
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,4 2 the Supreme Court once again addressed
the question of whether a state can require an out-of-state mail order
company to collect use tax when the company's only connections with
the taxing state are by U.S. mail or common carrier.
36. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759. The Court noted that in 1965, over 2,300 localities imposed
local sales taxes and that in most states, the local sales tax was complemented by a use tax. Id. at
n.12.
37. D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30-31 (1988). Accord Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 n.5 (1992).
38. W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938). Accord Colonial
Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 623-24 (1981); Quill, 504 U.S. at 310, n.5.
39. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60 (internal footnotes omitted). As of 1965, there were eight
different rates of sales and use tax in the United States. Id. at 759 n. 13.
40. Id.at760n.14.
41. See discussion infra beginning at note 52 and Part III.D.
42. 504 U.S. 298.
10
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The Court first recognized that the evolution of its due process
jurisprudence since 1967 allowed a state, consistently with the Due
Process Clause, to require a mail order company that purposefully avails
itself of the market in that state to collect its use tax notwithstanding that
the company's only contacts with the state are by U.S. mail or common
carrier.43
However, the Court declined the invitation to overrule Bellas Hess
under the Commerce Clause. 4 The Court so declined on two grounds.
First, the Court felt that the existence of a use tax collection bright-
line rule "furthers the ends of the dormant Commerce Clause... by the
demarcation of a discrete realm of commercial activity that is free from
interstate taxation. ' The Court viewed such a use tax collection safe
harbor as establishing "the boundaries of legitimate state authority to
impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduc[ing] litigation
concerning those taxes. 46
Second, the Court noted that "a bright-line rule in the area of sales
and use taxes also encourages settled expectations and, in doing so,
fosters investment by businesses and individuals., 47 In this context, the
Court speculated that "the mail-order industry's dramatic growth over
the [previous] quarter century is due in part to the bright-line exemption
43. Id. at 306-08.
44. Id. at 309-19.
45. Id. at 314-15. Although the text of the Commerce Clause contains only an affirmative
grant of authority to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the Court has long interpreted it to
include an implied, or "dormant," limitation on the power of the states to burden interstate
commerce. S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85, 185 n.2
(1938); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,236 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
46. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315. The Court's bright line rationale is highly dubious in view of the
volume of post-Quill litigation over the nature and extent of physical presence necessary to establish
Commerce Clause use tax collection nexus. Compare Orvis Co., Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654
N.E.2d 954 (N.Y. 1995) (finding that visits to nineteen wholesale customers four times per year or
forty-one visits to customers during three-year audit period are each sufficient to establish
substantial nexus as there is demonstrably more than a slightest presence in state), and Ariz. Dep't
of Revenue v. O'Connor, 963 P.2d 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that four deliveries and
installation services provided to one customer over a two month period, four repair visits by
employees or local representatives over three-year warranty period, and seventeen custom
furnishing transactions over four years were sufficient to establish nexus as activities are
significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market for the sales),
with Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Share Int'l, Inc., 667 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 676
So.2d 1362 (Fla. 1996) (determining that once the Bellas Hess/Quill "bright-line" is satisfied, it
must then be determined whether the seller's activities within the state establish a substantial nexus;
four annual three-day in-state appearances at seminars or conventions insufficient to establish
substantial nexus), and In re Intercard, Inc., 14 P.3d 1111 (Kan. 2000) (finding eleven in-state
installation visits to company's largest customer in Kansas over three month period too isolated,
sporadic and insufficient to establish substantial nexus).
47. Quill, 504 U.S. at 316.
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from state taxation created in Bellas Hess., 48  Therefore, the Court
viewed the "interest in stability and orderly development of the law that
undergirds the doctrine of stare decisis" as counseling in favor of
affirming Bellas Hess.49
None of the concerns that motivated the Court in Quill are
applicable in the income tax context. First, the Court twice noted that it
had never imposed a physical presence requirement for any tax other
than for use tax collection.5" Indeed, as the cases in Part IV, infra,
demonstrate, the Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of
the business situs rule for the taxation of intangibles or the income
derived from the licensing of intangibles-a rule that by its very terms
rejects physical presence as a jurisdictional requirement for taxation.
For the same reason, there is no settled expectation of a physical
presence rule as applied to the income taxation of intangibles. Neither in
Quill, nor in any previous or subsequent case, has the Court even hinted
that intangibles are entitled to the same safe harbor from nexus that
Bellas Hess created for use tax collection. In contrast, the grudging
nature of the Court's affirmance of Bellas Hess5' should caution against
relying on Quill as authority for a physical presence safe harbor for
intangibles.
Lastly, running through the Court's opinion is a concern for the
same unique burdens of use tax collection that informed the Court's
decision in Bellas Hess. The Court noted that North Dakota required
any seller who advertised in the state three times per year to collect use
48. Id.
49. Id. at 317 (internal quotation omitted).
50. Id. at 314, 317. It is worth noting that a corporation, being a legal fiction, can never be
said to be "physically present" anywhere. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945) (determining that when used with reference to a corporation "the terms 'present' or
'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities of the [corporation] within the state .... ).
In all cases a corporation can only be said to be present in a state to the extent it has representatives
or engages in economic activities in that state. The Court's "physical presence" rule in Quill cannot
therefore be interpreted literally. It can only be understood to be a shorthand term for the result of
the case; that an out-of-state seller whose only connections with the taxing state are advertising and
delivery via common carrier lacks the requisite nexus with the state to require it to collect use tax.
See Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical "Physical Presence" Constitutional
Standard, 54 TAX LAW. 105 (2000), for an excellent discussion of these principles.
51. "While contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result
were the issue to arise for the first time today, Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with Complete Auto
and our recent cases." Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977), established the modem four-part test for determining whether a state tax on interstate
commerce is consistent with the Commerce Clause. The four requirements are: the tax must be
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, must be fairly apportioned, must
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and must be fairly related to services provided by the
state. Id.
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tax and that similar obligations might be imposed by any of the more
than 6,000 taxing jurisdictions that imposed a use tax as of 1992.52
These concerns are simply irrelevant in the income tax context. Only 45
states and the District of Columbia impose a corporate income tax.53 In
addition to the District of Columbia, only one other locality-New York
City-imposes a general corporate income tax.
54
The burdens of filing annual income tax returns reporting one's
own income to no more than 47 taxing authorities are simply not of the
nature or magnitude of reporting use tax collected from hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, of purchasers in thousands of taxing
jurisdictions, on a quarterly or even monthly basis. Therefore, the
burdens of use tax collection that provided the primary foundation for
Quill simply do not apply to the corporate income tax.55
D. State Caselaw Supports Economic Presence as the Correct Nexus
Standard for the Income Taxation of a PIC
The issue of whether the Commerce Clause requires a PIC to have
physical presence within a state before the state may tax income
received by the company from its licensing of intangibles to its affiliates
has generated considerable academic controversy.56 However, the issue
52. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6.
53. 1 HEALY & SCHADEWALD, supra note 6, at 1-3.
54. 4 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2002 CONSENSUS OF
GOVERNMENTS: COMPENDIUM OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES, tbl.45, 92, 101, 125 (2005). Ernst &
Young estimate that 728 local jurisdictions in the United States impose business income taxes and
1,185 local jurisdictions impose gross receipts taxes on general businesses. State and Local
Jurisdictions Imposing Income, Franchise, and Gross Receipts Taxes on Business, QUANTITATIVE
ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS (Ernst & Young), Mar. 7, 2007, available at
http://www.ey.com/Global/download.nsf/US/ImposingTaxes on Businesses/Sfile/Imposing_
Taxes on Businesses.pdf. It is impossible to evaluate the extent of any constitutionally significant
burdens imposed on interstate commerce as a result of applying an economic nexus test to these
taxes because the report does not define the scope of any applicable tax base. For example, if the
term "gross receipts taxes" includes a sales tax imposed solely on the gross receipts of the vendor,
nexus for such a tax is determined by the Quill physical presence test. See, e.g., Kmart Props., Inc.,
v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2006-NMCA-26, 25-42, 139 N.M. 177, 186-90, 131 P.3d 27, 36-
40 (2001). Consequently, including these taxes in any assessment of the burdens imposed by an
economic nexus test would be inappropriate. In terms of the burdens issue, it is far more telling that
only two localities impose a general tax on net income derived from sources within the locality.
55. See, e.g., Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 233-34 (W.Va. 2006).
56. Compare Tun-Jen Chiang, State Income Taxation of Out-of-State Trademark Holding
Companies, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (2003) (stating that physical presence is required), and Plant,
supra note 25 (same), with Michael T. Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps Quill: Constitutional Nexus,
Intangible Property and the State Taxation ofIncome, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407 (1994) (stating that
physical presence not required), and Cory D. Olson, Comment, Follow the Giraffe 's Lead - Lanco,
Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation Gets Lost in the Quagmire that is State Taxation, 6 MINN. J.
13
Laskin: Only a Name? Trademark Royalties, Nexus, and Taxing That Which En
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
has proven to be far less controversial in the state appellate courts. As of
this writing, every state appellate court that has squarely addressed the
issue has ruled that physical presence is not required for a state to have
Commerce Clause income tax nexus with a PIC.
57
In ruling that the Quill physical presence requirement is
inapplicable to an income tax, state courts have noted that the Supreme
L. Scl. & TECH. 789 (2005) (same).
57. See cases cited supra note 27.
In other contexts, state appellate courts have also held that the Commerce Clause does not
require physical presence for a state to impose a tax other than use tax collection. See, e.g., Couchot
v. State Lottery Commission, 74 Ohio St. 3d 417, 1996-Ohio-262, 659 N.E.2d 1225 (allowing state
to tax lottery proceeds received by nonresident where there is no physical presence); Borden Chems.
& Plastics, L.P. v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (allowing state to tax income
received by nonresident partners of a partnership doing business in Illinois where there is no
physical presence). But see Lanzi v. Ala. Dep't of Revenue, No. 2040298, 2006 Ala. Civ. App.
LEXIS 406 (Ala. Civ. App. June 30, 2006) (finding that a nonresident limited partner in an
Alabama limited partnership lacked sufficient due process minimum contacts with state as his
ownership interest in the partnership, without more, did not establish either a commercial domicile
or business situs in Alabama).
One appellate court has ruled that physical presence is required to establish Commerce
Clause franchise tax nexus. Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App. 2000).
In Bandag Licensing, Texas sought to impose franchise tax on an Iowa corporation solely because it
possessed a license to do business in Texas. Id. at 298. Bandag received patent royalty payments
from a Texas affiliate. Id. However, Texas was precluded by state law from imposing its franchise
tax as a result of the royalty income. See id Therefore, Bandag Licensing did not involve a state's
assertion of nexus due to the receipt of income derived from intangibles. In a subsequent case, the
Court clarified that the physical presence test is met if the taxpayer maintains "retail outlets,
solicitors, or property within the state." INOVA Diagnostics, Inc. v. Strayhom, 166 S.W.3d 394,
402 (Tex. App. 2005). The use of a trademark or other intellectual property within the state should
satisfy the constitutional test albeit Texas would be precluded from taxing royalty income by state
law.
In Tennessee, the Court of Appeals applied a physical presence income tax nexus standard
in a case involving a national credit card issuer, without deciding whether the Commerce Clause
compelled such a standard. J.C. Penney Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1999) (declining to rule that physical presence is not required; the state had failed to articulate
a reason to distinguish the case from the use tax collection obligation at issue in Quil). The court
later clarified that it was not its purpose to decide in J.C. Penney whether physical presence was
required to establish Commerce Clause income or franchise tax nexus. America Online, Inc. v.
Johnson, No. M2001-00927-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 555, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July
30, 2002). Whether the Commerce Clause requires a physical presence nexus standard for income
and franchise tax therefore remains an open question in Tennessee. On the same facts as in JC.
Penney, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that significant economic presence is the appropriate
Commerce Clause nexus standard for taxes other than sales and use tax collection. MBNA, 640
S.E.2d 226. The court held that, in addition to the "purposeful [availment]" required by the Due
Process Clause, the Commerce Clause requires an additional examination of "the frequency,
quantity and systematic nature of a taxpayer's economic contacts with a state." Id. at 234. The
Court found that MBNA had a significant economic presence in West Virginia, based on its
continuous and systematic direct mail and telephone solicitation and promotion of its national credit
card services, as well as MBNA's significant gross receipts from West Virginia consumers of those
services. Id. at 235-36.
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Court explicitly limited its Commerce Clause ruling in Quill to use tax
collection.58 Next, the courts have recognized that the Supreme Court in
Quill was heavily motivated by stare decisis concerns to preserve the
bright-line, physical presence rule for use tax collection originally
declared in Bellas Hess twenty-five years previously. 59 No such stare
decisis concerns inform the issue of income tax nexus, because the Court
has never previously required physical presence for a state to impose a
tax on income derived from intangibles.6 °
Some commentators have asserted that it would be incongruous to
allow an economic presence nexus test for income tax since physical
presence is required for use tax collection.61 However, as recognized by
the state courts that have decided the issue, both the distinctions between
the nature of the two taxes and the differing burdens imposed on
taxpayers by those taxes justify a different nexus standard.
As the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated:
[A] sales and use tax can impose a special burden on interstate
commerce beyond just the payment of money.[ 62] Unlike an income
tax, a sales and use tax can make the taxpayer an agent of the state,
obligated to collect the tax from the consumer at the point of sale and
then pay it over to the taxing entity. Whereas, a state income tax is
usually paid only once a year, to one taxing jurisdiction and at one rate,
58. Kmart Props., Inc., v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2006-NMCA-26, 21, 139 N.M. 177,
185, 131 P.3d 27, 35 (2001); A&F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 194 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 2006 OK CIV APP 27, 10, 132 P.3d 632, 635;
MBNA America Bank, 2006 W. Va. LEXIS, *20.
59. Kmart Props., 2006-NMCA-26, 21, 139 N.M. at 185, 131 P.3d at 35; A&F Trademark,
605 S.E.2d at 194; Geoffrey, 2006 OK CIV APP 27, 16, 132 P.3d at 638; MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at
232.
60. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
61. "[T]here is but one Commerce Clause and it applies regardless of the type of tax
involved." Paul H. Frankel et al., Lanco - It Isn't Over Yet, 40 ST. TAX NOTES 227, 228 (2006).
See also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Holding Intellectual Property, 39 GA. L. Rav. 1155, 1173, 1173
n.93 (2005). Cerro Copper Products, the administrative decision upon which Professor Nguyen
relies, has been overruled. Cerro Copper Products, Inc. v. Ala. Dep't Rev., 1995 WL 800114 (Dec.
11, 1995), overruled by Lanzi, Ala. Dep't of Revenue, 2003 Ala. Tax LEXIS 75 (Sept. 26, 2003).
In overruling Cerro Copper Products, the administrative law judge ("AL") in Lanzi remarked,
"After studying the issue further, I am no longer convinced that the Supreme Court intended the
Quill physical presence test to apply beyond sales and use tax ..... [T]he Supreme Court's
statements in Quill that it has never applied a physical presence test to other type taxes [sic] must be
taken at face value." Id. at *9-11.
Both Cerro Copper Products and Lanzi were decided by Chief ALJ Bill Thompson of the
Alabama Department of Revenue, Administrative Law Division. Telephone interview with Michael
E. Mason, Director of Tax Policy, Alabama Department of Revenue (January 24, 2006).
62. The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that the routine burdens of paying a state tax and
filing a return do not raise any issues under the Commerce Clause. See supra notes 37-38, and
accompanying text.
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a sales and use tax can be due periodically to more than one taxing
jurisdiction within a state and at varying rates. ... Thus, collecting
and paying a sales and use tax can impose additional burdens on
commerce that the Supreme Court has repeatedly identified in prior
opinions.
63
In addition, use tax collection is based on the nature and extent of
the seller's activities in the state, whereas income and franchise taxes
imposed on income derived from intangibles is based on the use of the
intangible property in the state, irrespective of whether the owner of the
intangible is engaged in activities in the state.64 These differences make
it inappropriate to require physical presence before a state can tax
income received as a result of use within the state of an intangible
which, by definition, has no physical presence anywhere.6 5
In the final analysis, the economic presence income tax nexus test
for taxing income received by a PIC is neither new nor remarkable. It is
nothing more than the business situs rule for taxing intangibles, dressed
up for the modem economy. For more than a century, the Supreme
Court has recognized the constitutional authority of the states to apply
the business situs rule for the taxation of intangibles. It is to those cases
that we now turn.
IV. THE BUSINESS SITUS RULE FOR TAXNG INTANGIBLES
A. Historical Development of the Business Situs Rule
In Quill, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Commerce Clause
physical presence use tax collection nexus standard it had previously
established in Bellas Hess.66 The Court made clear that it had never
applied the physical presence standard to any tax other than use tax
collection. 67 The Court did not make this declaration in a jurisprudential
vacuum. Rather, the Court's dicta regarding other taxes is an implicit
recognition that the Court has consistently ruled that the business situs
rule satisfies federal constitutional requirements for state taxation of
intangibles or income derived from intangibles, precisely because
63. Kmart Props., 2006-NMCA-26, 22, 139 N.M. at 185, 131 P.3d at 35. Accord A&F
Trademark, 605 S.E. 2d at 195; Geoffrey, 2006 OK CIV APP 27, 15, 132 P.3d at 637; ABNA, 640
S.E.2d at 233.
64. A&F Trademark, 605 S.E. 2d at 194-95.
65. Id.
66. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1992).
67. Id.at314,317.
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intangibles cannot be said to have a physical presence anywhere.
68
In Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Company v. Kentucky,69 the
Supreme Court held that a franchise tax levied by Kentucky on a
Kentucky corporation for the operation of a ferry across the Ohio River
from Kentucky to Indiana violated the Due Process Clause to the extent
the state included, within the assessed value of the Kentucky franchise,
the value of a separate franchise granted by Indiana to operate a ferry
across the Ohio from Indiana to Kentucky.
The Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Company was a Kentucky
corporation. 70 It was a successor in interest to the original licensees of a
franchise granted by the Indiana Territory to operate a ferry across the
Ohio River from Indiana to Kentucky. 71  The company also was the
licensee of a franchise granted by the City of Louisville to operate a
ferry across the Ohio River from Kentucky to Indiana.72
Kentucky levied a franchise tax on the company's Louisville ferry
franchise from Kentucky to Indiana, the value of which included the
value of the Indiana franchise from Indiana to Kentucky.73 The Court
ruled that Kentucky violated the Due Process Clause in including the
value of the Indiana franchise in the assessed value of the Kentucky
franchise.74 In doing so, the Court noted that "beyond all question, the
ferry franchise derived from Indiana is an incorporeal hereditament
derived from and having its legal situs in that state. It is not within the
jurisdiction of Kentucky. 75
68. Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903) (holding that the
Due Process Clause barred Kentucky from imposing franchise tax on the value of a license granted
by Indiana to Kentucky corporation to operate a ferry over the Ohio River from Indiana to Kentucky
as Indiana was the business situs of the license); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936)
(finding West Virginia ad valorem property tax on accounts receivable and bank deposits of
Delaware corporation did not violate Due Process Clause as West Virginia was the business situs of
the intangibles); New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937) (upholding the New
York tax on income derived from sale by non-resident of membership in New York Stock Exchange
as New York was the business situs of the license); First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S.
234 (1937) (Delaware corporation properly subject to Minnesota ad valorem property tax on value
of stock in banks chartered in Montana and North Dakota as Minnesota was the business situs of the
stock); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940) (Wisconsin Privilege Dividend Tax
properly applied to dividends declared and paid outside of state by foreign corporation doing
business in Wisconsin); Int'l Harvester Co. v. Wisc. Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944) (same).
69. 188 U.S. 385.
70. Id. at 391.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 392.
74. Id. at 398.
75. Id.
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In Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox,76 the Court held that West
Virginia's ad valorem property tax did not violate the Due Process
Clause when applied to a foreign corporation's accounts receivable and
bank deposits having a business situs in West Virginia.
The Court began its analysis of the constitutionality of the West
Virginia ad valorem property tax as applied to Wheeling Steel's bank
deposits and receivables by observing: "When we deal with intangible
property, such as credits and choses in action generally, we encounter
the difficulty that by reason of the absence of physical characteristics
they have no situs in the physical sense, but have the situs attributable to
them in legal conception.
' 77
The Court then acknowledged that a state could properly apply the
rule mobilia sequuntur personam and treat intangibles as located at the
owner's domicile for tax purposes.78
Having stated the general rule of sourcing intangibles for tax
purposes, the Court nevertheless acknowledged that in modem times,
intangibles, as well as tangible personal property, are often used in the
conduct of business in locations other than at the commercial domicile
of the business. 79 The Court surveyed its prior caselaw and concluded
that those cases "recognize the principle that choses in action may
acquire a situs for taxation other than at the domicile of their owner, if
they have become integral parts of some local business.,
80
The Court found that Wheeling Steel had established a commercial
domicile in West Virginia and that the state could therefore, consistently
with the Due Process Clause, levy its tax on the entire value of the
corporation's bank deposits and receivables, without apportioning any
portion of the value of the intangibles to other states.
81
In New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves,82 the Court sustained the
constitutionality of New York's tax on the income realized by a
Massachusetts resident as the result of his sale of a seat on the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE" or "Exchange"). Mr. Whitney had always
been domiciled in Massachusetts and never had an office or home in
New York. 83 He never carried on any business in New York, executed
no trades on the floor of the Exchange, and did not buy and sell
76. 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
77. Id. at 209.
78. Id.
79. Id. at209-10.
80. Id. at 210 (citation omitted).
81. Id. at213-14.
82. 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
83. Id. at 371.
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securities on the Exchange for his firm account.
84
Whitney accepted orders from customers at his Boston office for
execution on the NYSE, which orders were executed on the Exchange
by members of the Exchange with New York offices, acting in their own
names as correspondents.
85
Whitney asserted that New York was without authority to tax his
profit on the sale of his seat on the Exchange, because he lacked a
business situs in New York, transacting all his business in
Massachusetts.86
The Court rejected Whitney's argument, noting that intangible
rights "may be identified with a particular place because the exercise of
the right is fixed exclusively or dominantly at that place. In [that] case
the localization for the purpose of transacting business may constitute a
business situs quite as clearly as the conduct of the business itself., 87 As
to the right to execute trades on the floor of the NYSE, the Court
observed that "[i]ts very nature localizes it at the Exchange. It is a
privilege which can be exercised nowhere else.",
88
In First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota,89 the Supreme Court ruled
that the Due Process Clause did not prevent Minnesota from imposing
its ad valorem property tax on a Delaware corporation based on the
value of stock the corporation owned in state banks chartered in
Montana and North Dakota, as Minnesota was the business situs of the
stock.
The Court found that First Bank Stock maintained within
Minnesota "an integrated business of protecting its investments in bank
shares, and enhancing their value, by the active exercise of its power of
control through stock ownership of its subsidiary banks." 90 The Court
therefore ruled that the corporation had established a commercial
domicile in Minnesota for its intangibles, including the stock it held in
the controlled out-of-state banks. 91
In holding that Minnesota's business situs rule for the ad valorem
property taxation of stock is consistent with the Due Process Clause, the
Court observed that, "[t]he rule that property is subject to taxation at its
situs, within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing state, readily
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 372.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 373.
89. 301 U.S. 234 (1937).
90. Id. at 237.
91. Id. at 237-38.
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understood and applied with respect to tangibles, is in itself meaningless
when applied to intangibles which, since they are without physical
characteristics, can have no location in space.
92
Finally, the Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that
Minnesota's imposition of the tax violated the Due Process Clause
because the stock was properly subject to tax in the bank domiciliary
states of Montana and North Dakota.93 The Court noted that both the
domiciliary state and the business situs state provide legal protection to
the corporation and are equally entitled under the Due Process Clause to
be reimbursed their share of the cost of providing governmental services.
The economic advantages realized through the protection, at the place
of domicil [sic], of the ownership of rights in intangibles, the value of
which is made the measure of the tax, bear a direct relationship to the
distribution of burdens which the tax effects. ... Like considerations
support their taxation at their business situs, for it is there that the
owner in every practical sense invokes and enjoys the protection of the
laws, and in consequence realizes the economic advantages of his
ownership.
94
In Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co.,95 the Supreme Court ruled that
the Wisconsin Privilege Dividend Tax did not violate the Due Process
Clause as applied to dividends declared and paid by a Delaware
corporation doing business in Wisconsin.
Wisconsin imposed a tax on corporations doing business in the
state for the privilege of declaring and receiving dividends.96 The tax
was applied to dividends declared and paid out of the apportioned share
of the company's corporate income attributable to business transacted in
Wisconsin.97 The company challenged the tax as violating the Due
Process Clause to the extent it was applied to a foreign corporation that
declared and paid its dividends outside of Wisconsin.98
In sustaining the constitutionality of the tax, the Supreme Court
rejected the contention that there was no nexus between the dividends
and Wisconsin, because the dividends were declared and paid outside
92. Id. at 240.
93. Id.at239-41.
94. Id. at 241. Cf, Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939) (determining that the Due
Process Clause permits both Alabama and Tennessee to "impose death taxes upon the transfer of an
interest in intangibles held in trust by an Alabama trustee but passing under the will of a beneficiary
decedent domiciled in Tennessee").
95. 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
96. Id.at441.
97. Id. at441-42.
98. Id. at 443.
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the state:
The substantial privilege of carrying on business in Wisconsin...
clearly supports the tax, and the state has not given the less merely
because it has conditioned the demand of the exaction upon
happenings outside its own borders. The fact that a tax is contingent
upon events brought to pass without a state does not destroy the nexus
between such a tax and transactions within a state for which the tax is
an exaction.
99
International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of
Taxation °° was a later iteration ofJ. C. Penney. Following the Supreme
Court's decision in J.C. Penney, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that
the legal incidence of the Wisconsin Privilege Dividend Tax fell on the
stockholders receiving the dividends, not upon the corporation declaring
them.01
The Supreme Court once again ruled that the tax did not violate the
Due Process Clause, notwithstanding that the burden of the tax fell on
out-of-state stockholders.10 2  In so doing, the Court declared the
stockholders' lack of physical presence in Wisconsin to be immaterial:
Personal presence within the state of the stockholder-taxpayers is not
essential to the constitutional levy of a tax taken out of so much of the
corporation's Wisconsin earnings as is distributed to them. A state
may tax such part of the income of a non-resident as is fairly
attributable either to property located in the state or to events or
transactions which, occurring there, are subject to state regulation and
which are within the protection of the state and entitled to the
numerous other benefits which it confers. 
103
B. Quill Does Not Establish a Physical Presence Income Tax Nexus
Rule
The thesis of this Article is that the business situs rule for taxing
income received from intangibles satisfies the Commerce Clause nexus
requirement as applied to royalties and other income received by a
trademark licensor from its affiliated licensees. 10 4 A corollary of this
99. Id. at 444-45.
100. 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
101. Id. at 439.
102. Id. at 441-42.
103. Id.
104. The business situs of a trademark is wherever the trademark is used. The value of a
trademark "is tied to the underlying business that generates the goodwill associated with the
21
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thesis is that the business situs rule as so applied is fully consistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in Quill. There are at least four arguments
to support this thesis.
First, nothing in Quill can fairly be read as overruling the Court's
business situs jurisprudence for the taxation of intangibles. Indeed, the
opinion never mentions this jurisprudence at all. It is hornbook law that
the Supreme Court does not normally overturn earlier authority sub
silentio.' °5 That business situs taxation of intangibles satisfies the Due
Process Clause is beyond dispute.
Second, notwithstanding that a number of the Supreme Court's
business situs cases involved taxpayers who had real estate and/or
tangible property in the taxing state, the Court has explicitly declared
that the presence of real estate and/or tangible property is of no
constitutional significance: "Nor are we able to perceive any sound
reason for holding that the owner must have real estate or tangible
property within the state in order to subject its intangible property within
the state to taxation."'
0 6
Third, although the Supreme Court's business situs jurisprudence is
grounded in the Due Process Clause, it is noteworthy that the Supreme
Court located its comments regarding the lack of a physical presence
requirement for taxes other than use tax collection in the Commerce
Clause portion of the Quill opinion. 0 7  Consequently, the Court's
Commerce Clause physical presence nexus rule for use tax collection
was consciously informed-and limited-by its reference to a contrary
rule for other taxes, including the business situs rule for taxing
intangibles.
Fourth, there is nothing in Quill that requires, or even suggests, that
the Commerce Clause nexus test must be identical for all taxes. °s One
trademarks .... Goodwill is bound to the business with which it is associated .... [T]rademark
rights in the United States... are wholly dependent upon actual use." Kmart Props., Inc., v.
Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2006-NMCA-26, 27, 139 N.M. 177, 187, 131 P.3d 27, 37 (2001)
(internal citations omitted).
105. Shalala v. I1l. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000). Accord San Remo
Hotel L.P. v. San Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088, 1095 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004).
106. Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15, 20 (1934), quoted in Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 213 (1936).
107. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 314, 317 (1992). The discussion of the
Commerce Clause begins at page 309 of the opinion.
108. Notwithstanding the argument that "there is but one Commerce Clause" and that therefore
the nexus test should be the same for all taxes, see supra note 61, there is nothing remarkable about
applying the same constitutional provision differently in varying contexts. For example, under the
Supreme Court's Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, the Court will analyze most state statutes
under a rational basis standard of review and the statute will be sustained if there is any set of facts
22
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commentator has noted that the Quill Commerce Clause nexus test is
neither higher nor lower than the Due Process test; it is merely different
because the two tests reflect different constitutional values and
concems.' 09 Similarly, the Commerce Clause nexus test itself should not
be identical for all taxes, because a "one size fits all" physical presence
test does not reflect material differences in the nature of each tax and the
characteristics of the asset or income being taxed. Such differences
render a physical presence Commerce Clause nexus test entirely
unworkable as applied to the taxation of intangibles or the income
derived therefrom.
Arguably, the unique burdens of use tax collection justify a
restricted physical presence Commerce Clause nexus test for use tax
collection." 0 Those burdens are simply inapplicable to a tax imposed
directly on the income derived from intangible property. In contrast, the
unique nature of intangibles-that they have no physical presence
anywhere-demonstrates that a physical presence test for taxing income
from intangibles would be entirely inappropriate. Indeed, such a test
would be oxymoronic.
The Supreme Court has declared, in the context of defining
appropriate due process standards for personal jurisdiction over an out-
of-state litigant, that "it is an inescapable fact of modem commercial life
that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and
wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for
physical presence within a State in which business is conducted."' 1  In
that rationally furthers the legislative objective. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 527-29 (1959). But if the statute trenches on a fundamental right, such as interstate travel, or
discriminates on the basis of a suspect classification, such as race, the statutory scheme will be
subject to a heightened, or strict, standard of review. Such statutes will be sustained only if the state
can demonstrate a compelling interest that justifies the discrimination. Johnson v. California, 543
U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (race); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (interstate travel).
Viewed in this light, the Quill nexus test can be viewed as a form of strict Commerce Clause
scrutiny that is justified because of the unique burdens of use tax collection-burdens that are
inapplicable to a direct tax on one's own income.
109. John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective,
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 372 (2003).
110. The physical presence test is not without its critics, even as applied to use tax collection.
Justice White was of the view that nexus is properly analyzed exclusively under the Due Process
Clause, and that any consideration of burdens should be separately addressed under the Commerce
Clause. Quill, 504 U.S. at 325-27 (White, J., dissenting). Taking Justice White's position a step
further, one commentator has urged that, in lieu of a physical presence nexus test, the Court should
adopt a balancing test similar to that used in Commerce Clause regulatory cases-whether the
nature and extent of the burdens imposed on interstate commerce outweighs the state interests
furthered by requiring out-of-state sellers to collect the use tax. Robert D. Plattner, Quill: 10 Years
After, 25 ST. TAX NoTEs 1017, 1020 (2002).
111. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
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ruling that an individual who "purposefully avails" himself of a forum
state's markets thereby subjects himself to suit in that state arising out of
those activities, the Court recognized that "courts must not be blind to
what all others can see and understand."
' 1 2
In affirming the constitutionality of the business situs rule for the
taxation of intangibles, the Supreme Court was not "blind to what all
others can see and understand."'" 3  Indeed, in acknowledging that a
taxpayer need not have any real and/or tangible property in a state and
still be liable for tax on account of the intangibles used by his business in
that state,114 the Court has explicitly seen and understood the unique
nature of intangibles that justify economic presence as the appropriate
Commerce Clause nexus standard-intangibles have no physical
presence upon which to base nexus. 1 5 The business situs rule for the
taxation of income from intangibles therefore satisfies the Commerce
Clause nexus test as applied to the income received by a trademark
licensor from its affiliates.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE BUSINESS SITUS RULE AS APPLIED TO PICS
A. The Taxation of an Author's Royalty Income
The business situs rule as applied to PICs has been criticized on the
grounds that the application of the rule in that context would subject
authors of copyrighted books to state income tax in every state where the
author's books are sold. 16 In making this argument, such critics ignore
112. Id. at 486 (citation omitted). A number of state courts, in ruling that economic presence
establishes income or franchise tax nexus, have also acknowledged the realities of modem
commercial life in rejecting a physical presence nexus standard. "[W]e believe that the Bellas Hess
physical-presence test.., makes little sense in today's world. . . . The development and
proliferation of communication technology exhibited.., by the growth of electronic commerce now
makes it possible for an entity to have a significant economic presence in a state absent any physical
presence there." Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 234 (W. Va. 2006).
113. See supra note 112.
114. See cases cited supra note 106.
115. Although the focus of this article is on trademark holding companies, the principles
enunciated herein have equal force when applied to income derived from other forms of intellectual
property, such as copyrights or patents. Cf General Motors Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 938
P.2d 481 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) ("[I]ntangibles like patents and copyrights have no physical location.
... Accordingly, we are not persuaded that a patent necessarily has a single discrete situs that the
patent income can follow....").
116. Nguyen, supra note 61, at 1180-84 (stating that to apply the business situs rule to royalty
income derived from licensing trademarks would cause John Grisham to be subjected to income tax
in every state where his books are sold). See also, Kmart Props., Inc., v. Taxation & Revenue
Dep't, 2006-NMCA-26, 36, 139 N.M. 177, 188-89, 131 P.3d 27, 38-39 (2001) ("KPI counters
24
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the essential difference between a licensor of intellectual property and
the author of a book.
The licensor of intellectual property has at least a contractual, and
often a legal, relationship with the licensee using the intellectual
property in the taxing state."17 On the other hand, the author of a book
typically has neither a legal nor a contractual relationship with the
retailers who sell the books. Instead, "[b]ook authors usually contract
with book publishers for the publication of their works, the publisher
taking title to all rights in the work subject to the provisions of the
contract.,,l8 For example, the books of noted legal thriller author John
Grisham are published by Random House. 19 Random House, not John
Grisham, has the contractual relationship with each retailer for the sale
of Grisham's books. As such, Random House is properly subject to an
appropriately apportioned income tax on the income it derives from sales
of the books in each state in which the books are sold.12 0 Random House
would apportion its receipts from the book sales on the basis of a
formula, the numerator of which is its total receipts in the taxing state
during the tax period, and the denominator of which is the publisher's
total receipts everywhere during the tax period.'
2
'
Unlike the publisher, John Grisham derives no income from the
sale of his books merely because of their association with his
copyrights. 122  While the measure of his compensation is undoubtedly
that, if we attribute physical presence for Commerce Clause purposes, based solely on the tangible
manifestation of KPI's marks in New Mexico, then the State's taxing jurisdiction would become
boundless. KPI poses a hypothetical dilemma that any out-of-state third-party, such as a national
book author... would have to pay gross receipts tax to New Mexico simply for allowing its
trademark to appear on products held for sale on Kmart's shelves.").
117. A PIC of course has both a legal and a contractual relationship with its affiliated operating
companies and trademark licensees. See discussion supra Part III.A.
118. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 175 n.43 (1985) (citation omitted).
119. Biographical information on John Grisham contained in this article is taken from John
Grisham: The Official Site, http://www.randomhouse.com/features/grisham/main.php (last visited
March 11, 2007).
120. See generally, JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION ch. 8C, § 1 (8th ed. 2005) (discussing federal constitutional limitations on formulary
apportionment of corporate income).
121. UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 15 (2005) "Approximately half of
the states with a corporate income tax have adopted the essential features of UDITPA and most of
the others have statutes that are consistent with UDITPA's basic approach, although some variations
are common." 2 POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 8, at 10-1.
122. Grisham's copyrights are in fact held by Belfry Holdings, Inc., a private holding company
in Tupelo, Mississippi, of which he is President and his wife, Renee Grisham, is Vice President. See
JOHN GRISHAM, INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN (2006); KnowX.com,
Corporate Records, http://www.knowx.com/corp/detail.jsp?db=MS-CORP&docid= 103079423935&
query=na (last visited Mar. 9, 2007). The author assumes that Belfry Holdings is in all likelihood, a
25
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based on the total volume or price of books sold, 123 the fact remains that
he is neither the seller of the books nor in any way affiliated with or
contractually linked to the seller. Grisham is entitled to royalty
compensation solely under his contract with Random House.
124
Therefore, his liability for state income tax on his royalty income is
determined without regard to where the books are sold.
125
Finally, at least one critic of the business situs rule argues that it
would be incongruous for the states to assert income tax nexus over
Grisham as the result of remote sales via telephone of a few autographed
copies of his books, because Quill forbids the states from imposing the
obligation to collect use tax under these facts.' 26  This argument is
grounded in a mistaken premise. The states are precluded from
imposing an income tax under these circumstances by Public Law 86-
272, 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84.127 Public Law 86-272 forbids a state from
small business corporation for which an election under § 1362(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,
I.R.C. § 1362(a) (2006), is in effect. The discussion in the text therefore assumes that the federal
income tax attributes of a Subchapter S corporation pass through to Grisham. Specifically, the
discussion assumes that Belfry Holdings is not subject to federal income tax under § 1363(a) of the
Code and that Grisham, as a shareholder of Belfry Holdings, is liable for a pro rata share of federal
income tax on the corporation's income under § 1366(a)(1). Mississippi follows the federal
treatment of S corporations for residents. ALL STATES TAX GUIDE (RIA) § 222-C (2007) (chart),
available at www.checkpoint.riag.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
123. Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 175 n.43.
124. See id. at 166-68 (owner of copyrighted song after reversion of copyright has neither a
statutory nor contractual right to royalty payments from pre-existing licensees of derivative work;
licensees are solely contractually obligated to publisher/licensor of song, who in turn is liable to
copyright owner for his share of royalties).
125. Some commentators have suggested that promotional book tours by authors such as
Grisham could subject him to state income tax on his royalty income, if the states can tax the royalty
income of out-of-state intellectual property licensors. See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 61, at 1181. As
explained in the text, Grisham is neither the seller of the books nor is he legally or contractually
affiliated with the booksellers. Therefore, any book tours in which he participates do not change the
analysis of the income tax consequences of his receipt of royalty income. He would of course be
subject to state income tax for any compensation he receives for the promotional tours, on an
appropriately apportioned basis. See, e.g., Newman v. Franchise Tax Bd., 256 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989) (finding that a nonresident actor's income from filming of the movie The Sting
apportioned to California on the basis of a formula, the numerator of which was total working days
within California and the denominator of which was total working days everywhere).
126. Nguyen, supra note 61, at 1184.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 381 provides, in relevant part:
a) Minimum standards
No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for any taxable
year ending after September 14, 1959, a net income tax on the income derived within
such State by any person from interstate commerce if the only business activities within
such State by or on behalf of such person during such taxable year are either, or both, of
the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State for sales
of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for approval or
26
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imposing a tax on or measured by net income if the only activity in the
taxing state consists of the solicitation of orders for sales of tangible
personal property, which orders are sent outside the state for approval or
rejection and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a
point outside the state. Public Law 86-272 would preclude a state from
imposing a net income tax on Grisham if his activities within the state
were limited to remote sales via telephone of a few autographed copies
of his books, irrespective of the appropriate limits of Commerce Clause
income tax nexus. 1
28
B. Single Sales Factor Apportionment and PICs: Fairly Dividing the
Pie
As asserted supra, the physical presence Commerce Clause nexus
rule is inappropriate as applied to the state taxation of income received
by a PIC from its affiliates. Rather, the business situs rule is the
appropriate Commerce Clause nexus test, as it is for the taxation of all
income from the licensing of intangibles. Consequently, a PIC that
receives income from an affiliate has Commerce Clause nexus with all
states in which the affiliate uses the intangible property in its business
operations.
Having said that, the question remains-what is the correct
apportionment formula to apply to the income of PICs? This is a critical
question, because an inappropriate apportionment rule will encourage
precisely the same tax avoidance techniques as does an inappropriate
physical presence nexus rule.
The business income of a multistate business is apportioned for
state tax purposes among all the states in which it operates.' 
29
Business income is defined in Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act ("UDIPTA") as: "[I]ncome arising from transactions and
activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and
includes income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition,
management, and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of
rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside the
State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State in the
name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders by such
customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from such
solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).
Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272 (codified as amended as 15 U.S.C. § 381 (2006)).
128. As discussed supra at Part IV.B, an individual who purposefully avails himself of the
taxing state's market has satisfied the Commerce Clause income tax nexus test.
129. UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 9 (2005).
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the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations.' 130
Clearly, the income received by a PIC from its affiliates constitutes
business income within the meaning of UDIPTA. 3'
The UDITPA rule for the apportionment of the business income of
a multistate business is to multiply the business income by a fraction, the
numerator of which is the property factor plus the payroll factor plus the
sales factor, and the denominator of which is three.
132
The property, payroll, and sales factors are each a fraction, the
numerator of which is each factor in the taxing state during the relevant
period and the denominator of which is the total factor everywhere.'
33
The problem with applying the typical equally-weighted three-
factor apportionment formula to the income of a PIC is that doing so
would not reflect the extent of the PIC's business activity in the state,
thereby perpetuating the very tax avoidance planning that the creation of
the holding company was designed to foster in the first place. An
illustration will explain.
Assume that Retail Corp. creates a wholly-owned affiliate, Hold
Co., located in the State of Michigan, which does not tax royalty
income.' 34  Retail Corp. assigns its trademarks, its Michigan real and
personal property and its Michigan employees to Hold Co., in return for
Hold Co.'s stock. 135  After the transaction, Hold Co. owns property
valued at $10,000,000 and has total payroll of $7,000,000, all located in
the State of Michigan. Hold Co. owns and operates Retail's Michigan
stores and owns all of Retail's trademarks.1
36
Assume further that Hold Co. receives a total of $20,000,000 in
130. Id. § 1(a).
131. Cf Mont. Dep't of Revenue v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 567 P.2d 901, 907 (Mont.
1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1042 (1978) (holding that royalties derived from patents and
copyrights developed by a mining company's research department constituted apportionable
business income); Xerox Corp. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 428 A.2d 1208 (Md. 1981) (holding that
royalties received from out-of-state licensees for use of patents, trademarks, and copyrights properly
apportionable under non-UDIPTA statute, because of close relationship of these royalties to Xerox's
in-state copier-related operations).
132. UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAx PURPOSES ACT § 9.
133. UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT §§ 10, 13, 15.
134. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 208.9(7)(c) (2006).
135. The transfer of property to a corporation solely in exchange for the corporation's stock is
a tax-free exchange under § 351 of the Intemal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 351 (2006).
136. That Hold Co. actually operates Retail's Michigan stores, plus its ownership of substantial
property in Michigan, makes it highly unlikely that a state could disallow the deductions taken by
the affiliates on the ground that Hold Co. lacks economic substance or business purpose. Similarly,
the addback statutes generally do not require addback when the formation of the PIC had a
substantial business purpose and economic substance. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-18-35(b)(3)
(2005). Those facts are irrelevant to the determination of whether a state has nexus with Hold Co.
28
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income in Year 1, $1,000,000 of which consists of royalties paid by the
affiliate in State X for use of the trademarks. The amount of royalties
paid is equal to 4% of the net retail sales made by the affiliate. Under an
equally-weighted three-factor apportionment formula, the amount of
royalty income apportioned to State X is $333,332, notwithstanding that
the actual royalty income from the State X affiliate is $1,000,000.137
The disparity is created by the fact that Hold Co. has no property or
payroll in State X to be included in the property and payroll factors.
Using a three-factor apportionment formula in this context allows Hold
Co. to shift 67% of its State X-sourced royalty income to Michigan,
which does not tax it. Similar income shifting would result in every
separate entity state in which Retail paid royalties to Hold Co. for the
use of the trademarks.
Hold Co.'s business activity in State X would more fairly be
represented by use of a single sales factor apportionment formula.
1 38
Section 18(b) of UDIPTA allows a state tax administrator to require the
exclusion of any one or more of the factors if the standard apportionment
formula does not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business
activity in the state.
139
Professor William J. Pierce, the drafter of UDIPTA, explained the
purpose of Section 18:
[Section 18] gives both the tax collection agency and the taxpayer
some latitude for showing that for the particular business activity,
137. (0/$10,000,000 + 0/$7,000,000 + $1,000,000/$20,000,000)/3 X $20,000,000 = $333,332.
138. The term "sales" in UDITPA means all gross receipts of the taxpayer not allocated to a
single state under the statute. UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 1 (g) (2005). It
is appropriate to source an apportioned share of Hold Co.'s gross receipts from royalty income
derived from trademark licensing fees to State X, without regard to Hold Co.'s costs of
performance, because the income-producing activity-the licensing of trademarks to Hold Co.'s
affiliate for use within State X-takes place wholly in that state Id. § 17(a); M.T.C. Reg. § IV.17(1)
(proposed Nov. 2006) available at http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate TaxCommission/
Uniformity/UniformityProjects/A -_Z/OBO%20HO%2OReport.pdf.
139. UDITPA § 18 provides:
If the allocation and apportionment provisions of this Act do not fairly represent the
extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this state, the taxpayer may petition for or
the tax administrator may require, in respect to all or any part of the taxpayer's business
activity, if reasonable:
(a) separate accounting;
(b) the exclusion of any one or more of the factors;
(c) the inclusion of one or more additional factors which will fairly represent the
taxpayer's business activity in this state; or
(d) the employment of any other method to effectuate an equitable allocation and
apportionment of the taxpayer's income.
UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 18.
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some more equitable method of allocation and apportionment could be
achieved. Of course, departures from the basic formula should be
avoided except where reasonableness requires. Nonetheless, some
alternative method must be available to handle ... the unusual cases,
because no statutory pattern could ever resolve satisfactorily the
problems for the multitude of taxpayers with individual business
characteristics. 140
Under UDIPTA, a departure from the standard apportionment
formula requires the presence of two elements. 141 First, the statutory
formula as a whole must be shown to not fairly represent the extent of
the taxpayer's business in the state; it is insufficient to show that only
one factor fails to meet this standard in order to invoke Section 18.142
Second, the alternative apportionment method must be reasonable.
43
Clearly, the standard three-factor formula as a whole does not fairly
represent the extent of Hold Co.'s business activity in State X. Although
Hold Co. derives substantial royalty income from State X, only a
fraction of that income is reported to State X, because Hold Co.'s
property and payroll factors in State X are "de minimis compared to the
sales factor in both amount and significance in terms of [its] business
activity" in the state. 1
44
In addition, it is reasonable for a state tax administrator to require
the holding company to use a single sales factor apportionment formula
in order to avoid the distortion of income that would result by allowing
the company to apportion its income on the basis of the standard three-
factor formula. 145  Reasonableness, in the context of UDITPA, has at
140. William J. Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax Purposes, 35 TAXES
747, 781 (1957). Professor Pierce also notes that the standard three-factor apportionment formula
was designed for manufacturing and mercantile businesses. Id. at 749.
141. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 700 P.2d 1035, 1042 (Or. 1985).
Accord Kmart Props., Inc., v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2006-NMCA-26, 51, 139 N.M. 177,
191, 131 P.3d 27,41 (2001); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285 (Ct. App.
2006), as modified upon denial of reh'g, No. C045386, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 660, at *1-2 (Ct.
App. May 4, 2006).
142. Twentieth Century-Fox, 700 P.2d at 1042.
143. Id. at 1043.
144. Kmart Props., 2006-NMCA-26, 49, 139 N.M. at 191, 131 P.3d at 41.
145. The constitutionality of single sales factor apportionment was upheld in Moorman
Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). A number of states have adopted the single sales
factor formula as the standard apportionment formula. This practice has been severely criticized as
poor tax policy, because when it is used in conjunction with the provisions of PL 86-272, it
encourages businesses that sell tangible personal property to locate in tax haven states while
substantially reducing the tax base in the market states. This issue is beyond the scope of this
article. For an excellent analysis of the issue, see MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET &POLICY
PRIORITIES, THE "SINGLE SALES FACTOR" FORMULA FOR STATE CORPORATE TAXES: A BOOM TO
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least three components. 1
46
"(1) [T]he division of income fairly represents business activity
and if applied uniformly would result in taxation of no more or no less
than 100 percent of taxpayer's income."'
147
Use of a single sales factor apportionment formula in the above
hypothetical would result in precisely 100% of the State X-source
royalty payments being apportioned to State X. 148 The same would be
true in every separate entity state in which Retail paid Hold Co. royalties
for the use of the trademarks.
"(2) [T]he division of income does not create or foster lack of
uniformity among UDIPTA jurisdictions."' 149
It is in the interest of all the separate entity states in which Retail
has retail stores to use a single sales factor apportionment formula to
apportion Hold Co.'s royalty income. Conversely, Michigan is
indifferent to the issue, because it does not tax the royalty income. Use
of the single sales factor apportionment formula therefore does not
create or foster lack of uniformity.
"(3) [T]he division of income reflects the economic reality of the
business activity engaged in by the taxpayer in [State X]."'' °
Hold Co.'s business activity in State X is limited to the receipt of
royalty income for the use of its trademarks. It has neither employees
nor property in the state. The single sales factor apportionment formula
perfectly reflects the economic reality of its business activity in State X.
Use of the single sales factor apportionment formula therefore
results in apportioning 100% of a PIC's royalty income received from an
affiliate in a given state to that state, rather than to a tax haven state that
had nothing to do with the retail sales that produced the royalty income.
Use of the single sales factor apportionment formula is the appropriate
formula to fully effectuate the business situs Commerce Clause nexus
rule for PICs.' 51
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR A COSTLY GIVEAWAY? (2005), available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-
27-Olsfp.pdf.
146. Twentieth Century-Fox, 700 P. 2d at 1043.
147. Id.
148. $1,000,000/$20,000,000 X $20 Million/l = 1,000,000.
149. Twentieth Century-Fox, 700 P. 2d at 1043.
150. Id.
151. The New Mexico Court of Appeals sustained the use of a single sales factor
apportionment formula as applied to trademark royalty income in Kmart Properties, Inc., v.
Taxation & Revenue Department, 2006-NMCA-26, IT 46-52, 139 N.M. 177, 190-92, 131 P.3d 27,
40-42 (2001). The Oklahoma ALJ also approved the use of single sale factor apportionment to
apportion the royalty income at issue in Geoffrey, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 2006 OK CIV
APP 27, 23, 132 P.3d 632, 640 n.12.
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VI. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Notwithstanding the conceptual incongruity of a physical presence
nexus rule for the taxation of intangibles, in recent years bills have been
introduced in Congress that, if enacted, would impose such a
requirement on a wide range of taxes in addition to use tax collection.
152
The principal features of the physical presence nexus bills are as
follow. 53  First, the Senate's version of the Business Activity Tax
Simplification Act ("the Act") would impose a physical presence nexus
standard for other business activity taxes ("BAT"), in addition to net
income taxes. 154  The term "other business activity tax" is defined
broadly to include:
(i) a tax imposed on or measured by gross receipts, gross income, or
gross profits;
(ii) a business and occupation tax;
(iii) a franchise tax;
(iv) a single business tax or a capital stock tax; or
(v) any other tax imposed by a State on a business measured by the
amount of, or economic results of, business or related activity
conducted in the State.
155
In addition, the Act would extend the protection of Public Law 86-
272 to income derived from services and intangibles.
56
Finally, the Act contains a number of "carve outs" that would allow
a business to maintain substantial physical presence in a state and still be
152. Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2003, H.R. 3220, 108th Cong. (2003);
Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2005, H.R. 1956, 109th Cong. (2005); Innovative and
Competitiveness Act, H.R. 4845, tit. I, subtit. A, 109th Cong. (2006).
153. The discussion in the text focuses on the Senate version of the Business Activity Tax
Simplification Act of 2006, S. 2721, 109th Cong. (2006). The Business Activity Tax Simplification
Act was introduced in the Senate on May 4, 2006 and referred to the Senate Finance Committee.
On June 28, 2006, the House Judiciary Committee approved by voice vote an amendment in the
nature of a substitute to House Bill 1956, the effect of which is to match the language in Senate Bill
2721. House Bill 1956 was scheduled for a vote by the full House on July 25, 2006 but the bill was
withdrawn from the calendar prior to vote.
154. S.2721§2(b).
155. Id. § 4(2)(A). The Act excludes from the definition of "other business activity tax" a sales
tax, a use tax, or a similar tax, imposed as the result of the sale or acquisition of goods or services,
whether or not denominated a tax imposed on the privilege of doing business. Id. § 4(2)(B).
156. Id. § 2(a).
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immune from business activity tax in that state.
5 7
The fiscal impact of the Act on the states would be substantial. The
National Governors Association ("NGA") estimates that the Act would
reduce business activity tax revenues by an average of 10.4%, costing
states and localities $6.6 billion annually. 158
As the NGA points out, the Act "represents a blatant and
unnecessary intrusion into the states' authority to govern. ... [T]he
authority to structure one's own tax system [is] a core element of state
sovereignty."' 59 Furthermore,
this change would shrink state tax bases by relieving out-of-state
businesses of BAT liability while allowing larger in-state companies to
circumvent tax laws by legalizing questionable tax avoidance schemes.
These outcomes would effectively constitute a federal corporate tax cut
using state tax dollars-a decision that, fundamentally, should be left
to state elected officials.
160
In its analysis of the Act, the Congressional Research Service
("CRS") concluded that it would lead to more "nowhere income.''
157. For example, a corporation could engage in business activities within a state for up to
twenty-one days in a taxable year without creating business activity tax nexus. Id. § 3(b). The
corporation can exceed the twenty-one day rule if it uses an agent (other than an employee) to
establish and maintain a market in the state, as long as that agent performs business services in the
state for any other person during the taxable year. Id. § 3(b)(2). There is no requirement that the
"other person" be unaffiliated with the corporation. Furthermore, section 3(b)(1)(C) allows a
corporation to gather information within the state in excess of twenty-one days per year if the
information is needed in order to perform services outside the state. Id.
158. NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, IMPACT OF H.R. 1956, BUSINESS ACTIVITY TAX
SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 2005, ON STATES 1 (2005). The NGA also notes that the Act would
overrule well-established business activity tax nexus jurisprudence in a number of states, upsetting
long-standing precedent in such industries as publishing, interstate trucking, general and customized
manufacturing, the sale of distributorships, intellectual property licensing, and the leasing of
computer hardware and software. Id. at 8-15.
159. Letter from National Governors Association to The Honorable Charles E. Grassley, Chair,
and the Honorable Max S. Baucus, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Finance Committee (June 1,
2006), available at http://www.nga.org search for "Grassley," select "Letters," and select "June 1,
2006 letter - BAT." In reflecting why it is that Congress has so seldom used its Commerce Clause
powers to intervene in the area of state taxation, two noted authorities on state taxation opine that
congressional restraint in this area is predicated on fundamental principles of federalism. Charles E.
McLure, Jr. and Walter Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention in State Taxation: A Normative
Analysis of Three Proposals, 31 ST. TAX NOTES 721, 722 (2004). "The states' sovereign power of
taxation has always been regarded as essential to their independent existence and thus to the federal
scheme that the Framers created." Id.
160. Letter, supra note 159.
161. STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STATE CORPORATE INCOME
TAXES: A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 15-16 (2006). "Nowhere income" arises because states use
different apportionment formulas and nexus rules. This creates opportunities for a multistate
business to avoid state income tax through tax planning. Id. at 5.
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CRS reports that if the Act is enacted, exceptions to its physical presence
standard, notably the 21-day rule and the expansion of Public Law 86-
272 to services and intangibles, "would... expand[] the opportunities
for tax planning and thus tax avoidance and possibly evasion."
' 162
There is little doubt that Congress has the power under the
Commerce Clause to enact a physical presence business activity tax
nexus standard. 63  But the wisdom of imposing such a standard in the
modem economy is highly questionable. As one commentator has noted
regarding the current physical presence nexus standard for sellers of
tangible personal property imposed by Public Law 86-272:
Current rules for determining income tax nexus fail miserably. P.L.
86-272 has ben [sic] justified as needed to limit extra-territorial
taxation and interference with interstate commerce, but it has no
conceptual foundation. Instead it reflects the exercise of raw political
power and prevents the assertion of nexus by states that should be able
to collect income tax from corporations deriving income from within
their boundaries. 164
Proponents of the Act often assert that it is inequitable for a state to
tax an out-of-state business in the absence of physical presence, because
such a business derives no benefit from governmental services provided
162. Id. at 15-16.
163. "The Congress shall have power.., to regulate commerce ... among the several
States...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In recent years, the Supreme Court has ruled that
Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in enacting statutes that regulate purely local,
non-economic activity. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Section 13981 of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that Congress's
Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of
marijuana in compliance with state law). Whatever the limits of the Lopez/Morrison line of cases,
state income taxation of a multistate business clearly implicates interstate commerce.
164. Charles E. McClure, Jr., Implementing State Corporate Income Taxes in the Digital Age,
53 NAT'L TAX J. 1287, 1297 (2000). Professor McClure's observation that Public Law 86-272
reflects "the exercise of raw political power" is borne out by the NGA's criticism of current
proposed BAT legislation as "a federal corporate tax cut using state tax dollars." Id. See supra text
accompanying note 157. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that, if H.R. 1956 were
enacted, federal revenues would increase by $106 million in 2007, by $1.2 billion over the 2007-
2011 period, and by $3.1 billion over the 2007-2016 period, as a result of reduced federal corporate
income tax deductions for state and local taxes. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST
ESTIMATE: H.R. 1956 2 (2006). Conversely, the CBO estimates that state and local governments
would lose more than $1 billion in the first year after H.R. 1956 was enacted. Id. at 3. This amount
would rise to about $3 billion annually by 2011. Id. While the CBO's estimated revenue losses are
less than the NGA's, they still "far exceed the threshold established in UMRA" (the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act). Id. The CBO estimates that about 70% of the estimated revenue losses
would come from ten states: California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. Id. at 4.
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by its market states. 165 This argument is both conceptually unsound and
demonstrably false.
The "no benefit" argument is conceptually unsound because it is
merely another way of asserting that it is fundamentally unfair for the
market states to require the corporation to pay tax in the absence of
government services. As such, the argument is grounded in the Due
Process Clause and not the Commerce Clause.
Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of
governmental activity. . .. [T]he due process nexus analysis requires
that we ask whether an individual's connections with a State are
substantial enough to legitimate the State's exercise of power over
him. ... In contrast, the Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement
are informed not so much by concerns about fairness for the individual
defendant as by structural concerns about the effects of state regulation
on the national economy. ... [The Commerce Clause] bars state
regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce. 166
Whether or not it is "fair" to an individual taxpayer to require it to
pay tax to its market states if those states provide it no governmental
services is wholly immaterial to whether or not interstate commerce has
been unduly burdened.167  Indeed, even if-as is clearly the case-the
market states do provide governmental services to an out-of-state
business, the provision of those services, while clearly establishing the
165. "The underlying principle of this legislation is that states and localities that provide
benefits and protections to a business, like education, roads, fire and police protection, water, sewer,
etc., should be the ones who receive the benefit of that business['] taxes, rather than a remote state
that provides no services to the business. By imposing a physical presence standard for business
activity taxes, House Bill 3220 ensures that state tax impositions are appropriately borne only by
those businesses that receive such benefits and protection from the taxing state." Business Activity
Tax Simplification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3220 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Arthur
Rosen, Member, International Law Firm) 2004 WL 1090199. See also Frankel et al., supra note 61,
at 229.
166. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
167. This is not to say that the fairness of a particular state income tax system is wholly
irrelevant under the Commerce Clause. "[A] State must.., apply a formula apportioning the
income of [a] business within and without the State. Such an apportionment formula must, under
both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, be fair." Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). While fairness is therefore an essential Commerce Clause attribute
in determining the appropriate amount of income that a state can properly tax, considerations of
fairness do not enter into the Commerce Clause nexus inquiry in determining whether a state has a
sufficient connection to the taxpayer to tax its income in the first instance. Whether it is fair for the
state to exercise its taxing power at all implicates only the Due Process Clause. Quill, 504 U.S. at
312; H. Beau Baez III, The Rush to the Goblin Market: The Blurring of Quill's Two Nexus Tests, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REv 581, 600 (2006) ("Fairness considerations play no part in the Quill Commerce
Clause test.").
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fairness of taxing that business, does not reduce the compliance burden
imposed on interstate commerce one iota. The "no benefits" argument is
merely another way of saying that the state has not given anything for
which it can ask return: a classic due process argument. 168  And, after
Quill, there can be no doubt that a taxpayer has due process nexus with a
state if it has purposefully availed itself of an economic market in that
state; physical presence is not required.
169
The "no benefits" argument is demonstrably false because it is clear
that the market states do provide governmental services to remote
business. Proponents of the "no benefits" argument assert that any
public benefit to remote business is at best indirect, the direct
beneficiaries being instate businesses and citizens. 17 In the context of a
state's authority to tax a multistate business, any distinction between
direct and indirect benefit is of dubious relevance.171 Be that as it may,
the "indirect benefits" argument is predicated on the manifestly false
assumption that public benefits are a zero sum game-if residents
directly benefit, then non-residents can at most be indirectly benefited.
Remote businesses clearly directly benefit from the public services
provided in their market states, as do the residents of those states.
Among the services provided to a remote business are a functioning
judicial system, a system of publicly built and maintained roads, police
and fire protection, and public schools and universities.
First, the existence of a functioning court system directly allows a
remote business to enforce its contracts and protect itself from unlawful
168. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
169. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307, 308.
170. Frankel et al., supra note 61, at 229.
171. As the Supreme Court has stated:
Nothing is more familiar in taxation than the imposition of a tax upon a class or upon
individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from its expenditure, and who are not responsible
for the condition to be remedied. A tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is... a means
of distributing the burden of the cost of government. The only benefit to which the
taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the privileges of
living in an organized society, established and safeguarded by the devotion of taxes to
public purposes. Any other view would preclude the levying of taxes except as they are
used to compensate for the burden on those who pay them, and would involve the
abandonment of the most fundamental principle of government-that it exists primarily to
provide for the common good. A corporation cannot object to the use of the taxes which it
pays for the maintenance of schools because it has no children.
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-23 (1937) (internal citations and
footnote omitted). Furthermore, the Court has made clear that "[t]here is no reason to suppose that
this latitude afforded the States [in Carmichael] under the Due Process Clause is somehow divested
by the Commerce Clause merely because the taxed activity has some connection to interstate
commerce; particularly when the tax is levied on an activity conducted within the State."
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623 (1981).
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competition in its market states. Indeed, in the absence of a functioning
court system in the market states, any judgment obtained by the remote
business in its home state would often be unenforceable.1 72 In the digital
age, it is highly likely that an intellectual property owner will be obliged
to resort to litigation in its market states in order to enforce its rights
against numerous unauthorized electronic users of its products. 
1 73
Second, a functioning system of roads directly allows a remote
business to deliver goods to its customers and to send representatives
into the state to provide services to those customers. The critical
benefits of those roads to the financial wellbeing of remote business was
dramatically illustrated on September 11, 2001, when all commercial air
traffic in the United States was halted following the terrorist attacks in
New York and Washington. As highway historian Dan McNichol noted,
"when every airplane was grounded, we were able to move goods and
people on the interstate [highway] system and keep the economy
moving."'
74
As is true of public roads, the existence of public police and fire
services benefit a remote business by protecting its property, employees
and representatives while they are in a market state in the course of
business. That these services directly benefit residents do not make
them any the less of a direct benefit to remote business. Yet the Act
172. Forty-six states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have adopted the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 13 U.L.A. 155-56 (2006), which requires states and
territories which have adopted the Act to give effect to the judgments of other states and territories,
if an exemplified copy of the foreign judgment is registered with the clerk of a court of competent
jurisdiction. In the remaining four states, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution,
Article IV, Section 1, requires a state to enforce a domesticated judgment entered by a court of a
sister state, as it would a judgment entered by its own courts. In either case, a remote business has a
right to enforce its judgments in the courts of its market states. Unlike most local government
services, the opportunity to enforce foreign judgments largely benefits nonresidents.
173. See, e.g., RIAA Leaning on Kids' Parents, WIRED NEWS, July 24, 2003,
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/l,59756-0.html (last visited August 21, 2006) (reporting that
Recording Industry of America issues at least 911 federal subpoenas to Internet providers, seeking
names and addresses of users of Napster file-sharing program in preparation of copyright
infringement lawsuits against users for illegally downloading copyrighted music).
174. T. R. Reid, The Superhighway to Everywhere, WASH. POST, June 28, 2006, at Al. The
federal government reimbursed the states 90% of the original cost of building the interstate highway
system; the states absorbed the remaining ten percent. Id. While the highways continue to receive
substantial federal funding for operations and improvements, the highways are owned, built and
operated by the state in which they are located, with the only exception being the federally-owned
Woodrow Wilson Bridge on the Capital Beltway (1-95/1-495). Wikipedia, Interstate Highway
System, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstate highway (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). Finally,
portions of the interstate highways were originally constructed as, and remain, state roads. See, e.g.,
New Jersey Turnpike, Historic Overview, http://www.nycroads.comroads/nj-tumpike/ (last visited
Sept. 25, 2006) ("The New Jersey Turnpike is designated 1-95 from EXIT 6 (Pennsylvania Turnpike
Extension) to the George Washington Bridge toll plaza.").
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would allow remote business to utilize state police and fire services tax
free, as long as the business was not in the state in excess of 21 days per
year, or even longer if its activities were entirely within the statutory
safe harbors.
Finally, remote business is continually benefited by the existence of
a public educational system, including the state university system. The
public educational system provides the business with well-educated
customers who can afford to purchase the goods or services of the
remote business. This directly benefits remote business by providing a
market for those goods or services that in turn creates profit for the
shareholders. Again, the fact that the customers and employees are also
directly benefited by the public educational system in no way detracts
from the benefits directly received by remote business through the
existence of that system-the public educational system serves both the
graduate by making him more employable and business by meeting its
need to sell its goods or services.
In discussing global competition, particularly in the areas of
biology, medicine and computer technology, Microsoft founder Bill
Gates constantly emphasizes the importance of the United States
maintaining a first rate educational system.' 75 He notes that job creation
and success in these fields have overwhelmingly been where there is a
great university and that, of the more than 25 of the top universities in
the world located in the United States, almost half are state
universities. 176  Furthermore, Mr. Gates acknowledges that the state
system produces more world-class graduates than the private system.1 77
Finally, Mr. Gates recognizes that it is necessary to have top-notch
elementary and secondary schools in order to produce "the great students
to go into these universities and do these incredible things.
178
As recognized by Mr. Gates, the stunning success of the modem
American economy is directly related to the strength of the American
public educational system. As he has noted, global competition for
skilled workers, particularly in China and India, requires the United
States to maintain a first class educational system so that the American
economy can continue to grow.1 79 In the final analysis, all business-
local and remote-benefits from the world-class education provided by
175. See, e.g., Bill Gates, Interview at the National Conference of State Legislatures (August
17, 2005) available at http://www.microsoft.com/events/executives/billgates.mspx.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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our nation's public schools and state universities. 1
80
VII. INCOME TAX NEXUS AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: SETTING
SOME PARAMETERS
In some respects, the PIC cases discussed in Part III D, supra,
present a relatively straightforward nexus scenario. In each case, the
trademarks were being used at a store, a paradigmatic physical location.
Once it is determined that a PIC has nexus as a result of an affiliate's use
of the marks, it is an easy enough matter to determine where that use
takes place. But how is nexus to be determined in the case of a business
that realizes income entirely through electronic commerce? Where, for
example, does a licensor of customized software that is downloaded over
the Internet in digital form have nexus?1
8
'
Several non-tax due process cases suggest a framework for analysis
of the issue. The cases fall broadly into one of three factual scenarios.
At one extreme are the cases involving a purely passive website. At the
other extreme are those cases involving a specifically identifiable
contract. Somewhere in between the two are cases involving an
interactive website that solicits users to purchase an intangible or a
service electronically. Examples of each follow.,
82
A. Passive Websites
In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,183 the court held that placing
an Internet advertisement on a computer server located in Missouri was
insufficient to create personal jurisdiction in New York. The plaintiff in
Bensusan owned a chain of jazz restaurants in the United States and
180. The current role of the state universities in meeting the educational requirements of the
modem economy reflects the history of public education in this country. The establishment of the
original Land-Grant colleges pursuant to the first Morrill Act (1862) reflected a growing demand for
agricultural and technical education in the United States. While a number of institutions had begun
to expand upon the traditional classical curriculum, higher education was still unavailable to many
agricultural and industrial workers. The Morrill Act was intended to provide a broad segment of the
American population with a practical education that had direct relevance to their daily lives. NAT'L
ASS'N OF STATE UNIVERSITIES & LAND-GRANT COLLEGES, THE LAND-GRANT TRADITION (1995).
181. Customized software, as used here, means and includes programming which results when
a user purchases the services of a person to create software which is specialized to meet the user's
particular needs.
182. The analytical tripartite "sliding scale" suggested in the text has been utilized by a number
of courts in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists in Internet domain name disputes. See,
e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Alitalia-
Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 349 (E.D. Va. 2001).
183. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
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elsewhere named "The Blue Note" and the defendant owned a jazz
restaurant in Missouri, also named "The Blue Note."18 4 The Missouri
Blue Note advertised its club via an ad on the Internet. I8 5 The ad
consisted of a calendar of scheduled entertainment, and a menu.' 86 It
was not possible to make reservations or to order or pay for tickets
electronically on the defendant's website.1
87
The New York-based Blue Note chain filed a trademark
infringement action in the Southern District of New York and the
defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 88  The
court held that merely creating a website, including a hyperlink to the
plaintiffs website, that was viewable in New York was insufficient
under the Due Process Clause to subject the Missouri defendant to
jurisdiction in New York.189 In ruling that there was no allegation that
the defendant had directed his activities specifically to New Yorkers,
and that therefore the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant
conducted any business in New York, the court stated, "Creating a site,
like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt
nationwide---or even world wide-but, without more, it is not an act
purposefully directed toward the forum state."'
' 90
B. Specifically Identifiable Contract
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson'9' was a trademark infringement
case. Patterson, a Texas software entrepreneur, entered into a written
agreement with CompuServe to sell software over CompuServe's
network. 192  During a three-year period, Patterson sent 32 files of
software to the network and made twelve sales in Ohio, totaling $650.193
Eventually, Patterson accused CompuServe of infringing on his
trademark. CompuServe filed a preemptive lawsuit in Ohio, its home
state, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not infringed Patterson's
trademark. 1
9 4
Patterson moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction
184. Id. at 297.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 301
190. Id.
191. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
192. Id. at 1260.
193. Id. at 1261.
194. Id.
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in Ohio.' 95  The court denied the motion, finding in personam
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause based on Patterson's signed
agreement with an Ohio company and an ongoing commercial
relationship with that company through the transmission of software
over the CompuServe network. 196 The court noted that the contacts
between the parties were deliberate and repeated even though they
yielded little revenue; the quality of the contacts rather than their number
satisfied Due Process fairness concerns.
197
C. Interactive Website
In Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc.,198 the court ruled that it had
personal jurisdiction over a diversity action between a Texas resident
and a California corporation that maintained an interactive gambling
website. The website invited users to pay a fee to play online poker and
other games. 199 Thompson did so and won, but the corporation failed to
pay him.200 He filed suit in Texas alleging breach of contract, fraud and
violation of Texas consumer protection laws.20 1 The court found
specific jurisdiction based upon a contract formed on the defendant's
interactive website that the defendant knowingly maintained to attract
paying customers to gamble online, irrespective of the customer's
location.20 2
D. Nexus Implications
The foregoing three cases suggest analytic parameters for
determining income tax nexus for electronic commerce. If the business
simply advertises its services or products on a passive website, and
offers no opportunities for a customer to contract or pay for those
services or products online, nexus would not be created merely as a
result of the creation or existence of the website. At the other extreme,
nexus would clearly be created if the business entered into a specific
contract with a readily identifiable customer to provide its services or
products online. In the case of a licensor of customized software, nexus
would exist wherever the contract authorized or allowed the customer to
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1263-67.
197. Id.
198. 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
199. Id. at 741.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 742-46.
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use the software. Finally, an interactive website that allows the general
public to pay online for specific digital services or products would create
income tax nexus where the customer uses the service or product. °3
This would include most, if not all, digital sales of canned software, such
as virus or spyware protection programs.
204
Objections might be raised that a nexus rule based upon the
foregoing analysis unfairly penalizes providers of canned digital
products or services, because a seller of the identical products in tangible
form would be within the safe harbor of Public Law 86-272 if it limited
its activities to the online solicitation of sales. The proper solution to
that problem is to establish uniform minimum nexus standards that
would apply to all businesses, irrespective of the form in which they
provide their products or services.20 5
A leading scholar advocates an income tax nexus standard based on
whether the taxpayer conducts significant amounts of the economic
203. It is of course possible to use a digital product while traveling. As one commentator has
observed in the related context of electronic commerce and sales and use taxation:
[T]his difficulty must largely be ignored as a result of practical necessity. The knowledge
of the service provider as to the location of origination/termination and of the
billing/service address will govern. However the provider records the event for its normal
business records undoubtedly will become the default for reporting the transaction even
though this reporting may not correspond to the actual facts.
Paull Mines, Conversing with Professor Hellerstein: Electronic Commerce and Nexus Propel Sales
and Use Tax Reform, 52 TAX L. REv. 581, 602 n. 117 (1997). Income tax nexus would exist, both
for digital products or services purchased under a specific contract or through an interactive website,
wherever the provider's normal business records indicate the customer will use the product or
service.
204. Canned software, as used here, means and includes programming that has general
applicability and/or has not been prepared at the special request of the purchaser to meet his
particular needs. It is sometimes known and/or described as "pre-written programming."
205. An economic presence nexus standard does not necessarily result in sourcing receipts
from the sale of intangibles or services to the market states. Sales other than sales of tangible
personal property are sourced to the state where the income-producing activity was performed.
UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 17 (2005). If the income-producing activity
is performed in more than one state, the sales are sourced to the state where the greater proportion of
the income-producing activity is performed than in any other state, based on costs of performance.
Id. This is an "all or nothing" determination, resulting in 100% of the sales being sourced to the
state with the greater costs of performance. The greater cost of performance rule is clearly
anachronistic in the digital age. As a result, a number of states include receipts from services in the
sales factor numerator based either on the percentage of total cost of performance incurred in the
state or on the ratio of time spent performing the service in the state to the total time spent on
performing the service. 1 HEALY & SCHADEWALD, supra note 6, at 1-729 to -733. Furthermore,
Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin have moved away from the greater cost
of performance rule for the provision of services, replacing it with a market-based approach that
sources the sale to the location of the recipients of the services. Id. at 1-724. Similarly, a number of
states have adopted a market-based approach for sourcing royalty receipts from the licensing of
intangibles. Id. at 1-658.
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activities that are factors in the state's apportionment formula.2 0 6 The
Multistate Tax Commission ("MTC") has adopted Professor McClure's
reasoning in promulgating its Factor Presence Nexus Standard for
Business Activity Taxes.20 7  The MTC's Factor Presence Nexus
Standard establishes uniform, objective de minimis nexus standards of
$50,000 in property or payroll, $500,000 of sales or 25% of total
property, payroll or sales before a state can impose a business activity
tax.
208
There is nothing sacred about the specific thresholds suggested by
the MTC's Factor Presence Nexus Standard. Furthermore, whatever
amounts are initially used to establish nexus can and should be updated
regularly for inflation. In the digital age, however, it makes eminent
sense to base income tax nexus on exceeding an easily verifiable,
uniform economic activity threshold rather than an anachronistic
physical presence requirement that is unsuited to the current economy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court got it right in promulgating the business situs
rule for taxing intangibles; a state's authority to tax intangibles cannot be
limited by considerations of the intangible's non-existent physical
location. The business situs rule remains the appropriate nexus standard
for taxing income from intangibles, including trademark royalty income.
As Quill is limited to use tax collection, the state court decisions that
uphold the business situs rule for taxing income from intangibles were
correctly decided. Although Congress has the power to impose a
physical presence nexus rule on the state taxation of income from
intangibles, such a rule would be completely incongruous in the modem
economy. Instead, nexus should be determined by the application of
uniform, easily verifiable economic thresholds that would apply
irrespective of the form in which the business provides its services or
products. Such a rule is the appropriate measure of a state's authority to
tax the income of remote businesses that benefit from the public services
provided by their market state governments.
206. McClure, supra note 164, at 1296.
207. MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N, FACTOR PRESENCE NEXUS STANDARD FOR BUSINESS
ACTIVITY TAXES (2003), available at http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate Tax_
Commission/Uniformity/UniformityProjects/A_-_Z/FactorPresenceNexusStandardBusinessAct
Taxes. pdf.
208. Id.
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